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THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE'S
MISPLACED EMPHASIS ON POSSESSION
Robert A. Zadek*
I. THE PROBLEM
The idea for this Essay came to me about fifteen years ago, when
I was a "Garmento"-an associate practicing law in the Garment
Center of New York City. The credit manager of a large textile com-
pany client called seeking help. A buyer with weak credit asked him
to approve a $500,000 order. The buyer was willing to grant a security
interest in its inventory-which would more than secure the $500,000
credit exposure-provided my client did not file a financing state-
ment. The buyer explained that once its trade creditors learned that
its inventory was encumbered, its trade credit would disappear and it
could not survive. What should my client do?
I suggested that my client set up a field warehouse on the buyer's
premises. All inventory would be placed under the control of the
warehouse and would not be released to the buyer until payment ar-
rangements were made. The inconvenience to the buyer would be
minimal, and my client would hold a perfected security interest with-
out having to file a financing statement. Everyone would win except
the trade creditors and other third parties who would have no easy
way to learn of my client's lien. Is this any way to run the law of
secured transactions? Why should the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) permit this?
Let us take this a step further. I often lecture to loan officers. At
a certain point in my lecture, I conduct the following dialogue with the
audience:
Question: "Do your loan approvals require that you hold a
first security interest in the inventory?"
Answer: "Yes."
Question: "Do you always verify that you have a first secur-
ity interest before you fund the loan?"
Answer: "Yes."
Question: "How do you make sure?"
Universal Answer: "I do a postfiling search."
* Of counsel to Buchalter, Nemer, Fields & Younger, San Francisco, California.
392 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELESLAW REVIEW
"How silly. How naive," I think to myself. I explain to them that
unless the lenders know, by actual physical inspection, that on the
date they file their financing statement all of the inventory is in the
actual physical possession of the borrower, it is impossible to confirm
lien priority. The lenders are shocked and surprised. The utility, con-
venience, and certainty that the filing provisions of the UCC are sup-
posed to provide are undermined by the word "goods" as included in
section 9-305 of the UCC.1
II. TI PROBLEM WORSENS
UCC section 9-305 compounds the problem by expanding the
concept of possession to include goods held by a bailee and by provid-
ing that the secured party is deemed to have possession "from the
time the bailee receives notification of the secured party's interest."2
The loan officer, graduate of my lecture, now knows to verify, at
the exact moment of filing, that no other secured party has possession
of the collateral. The officer arranges for an inspection of the collat-
eral at the moment of filing and learns that some of the collateral is
held in a public warehouse in the name of the debtor. The officer
visits the warehouse and inquires whether the warehouse supervisor
has received notification from any other purportedly secured party as-
serting a security interest in the collateral. The.warehouse supervisor
does not remember and just wants to be left alone. How can a se-
cured party ascertain its priority?
Can this be called a "modernization" of commercial law where a
statute requires that a secured creditor must actually visit each loca-
tion of the debtor's business where inventory or equipment may be
located to confirm priority? Is it realistic? Does anybody actually do
it?
III. My THESIS
Perfection by possession of inventory or equipment is:
(1) wholly unnecessary for commerce;
(2) an anachronistic concept which has no place in a modern
commercial statute; and
(3) a mostly unknown trap for the secured lender.
1. U.C.C. § 9-305 (1990). "A security interest in ... goods ... may be perfected by
the secured party's taking possession of the collateral." Id. (emphasis added).
2. Id.
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I urge that the ongoing revision of Article 9 remove possessory
perfection of a security interest in, goods. No one will miss it. The
only real consequence will be the "non-consequence" that all such se-
curity interests will be perfected by filing, and this is the case now!
As more fully discussed below, the pledge was created at a time
when there was no other-means to publicize a security interest. Other
means now exist, and the pledge has outlived-by about fifty years-
its usefulness.
IV. THE HISTORY OF THE PLEDGE
As Gilmore points out, the pledge "dates from the beginning of
legal history."3 When the ancients had:.to do deals, they used what
they had because they could not wait for paper, ink, and filing systems
to be created. The concept developed that once a lien was granted to
a secured party-or whatever a creditor was called 5000 years ago-
the debtor's other creditors would be. defrauded by the secured party
allowing the debtor to remain in possession of the- collateral. Thus,
the only way to alert creditors of a lien was for ,the secured creditor to
take possession.4 Makes sense to me ... then.
At common law the creditor perfected its security interest by tak-
ing physical possession of the collateral.5 Gilmore states that "[t]he
requirement that a secured party take possession of, his collateral" has
come to be known as "the pledge."6 The fundamental policy behind
the pledge is that the debtor should be precluded from representing to
other third parties that the collateral is owned free and clear of the
secured party's interest.7 The secured party, by taking possession of
the pledged collateral, indicates to potential creditors that it has a se-
curity interest in the collateral.. As Professor Coogan points out,
[i]t was assumed that potential creditors and purchasers
would rely on a debtor's apparent ownership of assets physi-
cally in his possession; this was part of the basic common law
3. 1 GRANr GkmloRE, SECURITY INTERIs IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 14.1 (1965).
4. Id. at 439.
5. "Until the early nineteenth century, the only way to create a valid security interest
in personal property was by physical pledge . . . ." Peter F. Coogan, Article 9-An Agenda
for the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.. 1012, 1014 (1978).
6. 1 GiLMORE, supra note 3, § 14.1.
7. The editorial comment to Twyne's Case stated that a grant of a security interest
without a transfer of possession was "always a badge of fraud." 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 811
n.(B) (Star Ch. 1601). The court explained that "by reason [of the pledgor's continued
possession] he... trafficked with others, and defrauded and deceived them." Id. at 812-13
(footnote omitted).
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doctrine of protecting creditors against undisclosed interests
in property. In other words, it was a requirement that there
be public notice of the creation of a security interest; physical
pledge, presumably, gave that public notice.8
V. THE LAW Now
The drafters of the UCC borrowed from the common law of
pledges when they imported the concept of possession into Article 9. 9
Significantly, as Gilmore writes, "The traditional differentiation be-
tween possessory (pledge) and nonpossessory interests was accepted
without question."'" In my view, once this major decision was made,
without much thought, the die was cast with the problems discussed
below as the unfortunate but inevitable consequence.
Article 9, which governs secured transactions, sets forth the steps
that a secured party must take in order to perfect a security interest in
the debtor's property taken as collateral." Section 9-302(1) requires
the filing of a financing statement to perfect all security interests ex-
cept those listed in subsections 9-302(1)(a)-(g).12 The first and most
important exception for purposes of this Essay is subsection 9-
302(1)(a) which states, "a security interest in collateral in possession
of the secured party under Section 9-305. ' 13 Thus, under section 9-
305 the secured party is given the option of perfecting a security inter-
est through possession, as opposed to filing.' 4
8. Coogan, supra note 5, at 1014-15 (footnote omitted).
9. See official comments to UCC §§ 9-101, 9-205, 9-302, and 9-305 which make refer-
ences to the common law. More notably, § 1-103 states that common-law rules were in-
tended to supplement UCC provisions.
10. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 9.2.
11. UCC § 9-303(1) provides that
[a] security interest is perfected when it has attached and when all of the applica-
ble steps required for perfection have been taken. Such steps are specified in
Sections 9-302, 9-304, 9-305, and 9-306. If such steps are taken before the secur-
ity interest attaches, it is perfected at the time it attaches.
12. U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (1990).
13. Id § 9-302(1)(a).
14. UCC § 9-305 provides as follows:
A security interest in letters of credit and advices of credit (subsection (2)(a) of
Section 5-116), goods, instruments (other than certificated securities), money, ne-
gotiable documents, or chattel paper may be perfected by the secured party's
taking possession of the collateral. If such collateral other than goods covered by
a negotiable document is held by a bailee, the secured party is deemed to have
possession from the time the bailee receives notification of the secured party's
interest. A security interest is perfected by possession from the time possession is
taken without a relation back and continues only so long as possession is retained,
unless otherwise specified in this Article. The security interest may be otherwise
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VI. WHAT Is POSSESSION?
One of the problems with perfection through possession is the
uncertainty as to what constitutes "possession." Section 9-305 men-
tions the "secured party's taking possession of the collateral."'Is But
what constitutes "taking possession?" Is it having physical custody or
exclusive control? When does it begin and when does it end? The
cases discussed later in this Essay reveal that these questions do not
always have clear answers.
Interestingly, despite the importance of possession in Article 9,
possession itself is not defined. Professor Clark suggests that "the
drafters wisely left the "matter to be decided by case law."' 6 Unfortu-
nately, the courts have not always shown the same wisdom as the
drafters. Because the UCC does not define possession, the courts do
not have a clear idea of what common-law concepts of possession
should be used to decide cases where the issue of possession for pur-
poses of perfection is in dispute.
Suppose that the debtor buys a computer from the secured party
and makes a down payment. As security for the remainder, the se-
cured party allows the debtor to take the computer, but does not pro-
vide the user access code until the debtor makes full payment. Does
the secured party have sufficient possession for purposes of perfec-
tion? The answer is not obvious. If the focus is on physical posses-
sion, the secured party is not perfected. If the issue is control, by
retaining the access code the secured party has retained control. Most
likely, the computer is useless to the debtor without an access code-
assuming that the debtor is not a computer hacker or that the debtor
does not destroy the computer out of malice or caprice. By retaining
the access code, the secured party, for all intents and purposes, re-
mains in control of the collateral.
In re Bialk'7 presents an even stronger case for concluding that a
secured party-not in actual physical possession of the collateral-has
possession of collateral under Article 9 nevertheless. The debtor took
out a loan from the secured party. As collateral, the debtor granted a
perfected as provided in this Article before or after the period of possession by
the secured party.
15. Id.
16. See BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACrIONS UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE 7.07(1) (rev. ed. 1993). The drafters may have failed to define
possession not because of great wisdom, but because they were unable to come up with a
satisfactory definition. The difficulty of drafting a workable definition should have given
the drafters pause about providing for perfection by possession in the first place.
17. 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 519 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
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security interest in a collection of medals and coins stored in a safe-
deposit box.' 8 The debtor gave the secured party the only keys to the
safe-deposit box containing the coins and medals.19 Yet, the court
concluded that the secured party did not perfect a security interest in
the medals and coins because "any depositor can gain access to a box
without a key with little effort. '20 Moreover, the court reasoned that
"[p]ossession of keys would not be so open and obvious as to come to
the attention of an interested person.'
Unless going into a bank with a crowbar is a customary way of
opening safe-deposit boxes, it is not obvious to me how the debtor can
gain access to the contents of the safe-deposit box without having a
key, assuming the bank was notified that the secured party has a se-
curity interest in the contents of the box and now holds the only key
to it. If holding the only key-other than the bank's-to a safe-de-
posit box does not constitute complete dominion and control over the
contents of the box, many wealthy widows have reason to be nervous
about their jewelry.
The other reason the court concluded that there was no perfec-
tion-that "[p]ossession of the keys would not be so open and obvious
as to come to the attention of an interested person"-is even more
puzzling. Does the secured party have to hang the keys on a big sign
which reads& that the keys are to the debtor's safe-deposit box? The
UCC does not require that one must advertise the fact in addition to
taking possession. The court seems to be confusing the concept of
possession with the historical implications of and the rationale behind
the common-law pledge.
Despite the holding in Bialk, actual possession is not required
because section 9-305 allows for constructive possession through a
bailee.? But as the following case indicates, courts do not always rec-
ognize constructive possession when they see it. Consider a situation
where a debtor purchases shares of stock from the secured party using
a down payment.3 The debtor secures the balance of the purchase
price by agreeing to place the securities in escrow until the debtor
18. Id. at 520.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 524-25.
21. Id. at 524.
22. UCC § 9-305 states in pertinent part, "If such collateral other than goods covered
by a negotiable document is held by a bailee, the secured party is deemed to have posses-
sion from the time the bailee receives notification of the secured party's interest."
23. In re Dolly Madison Industries, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd
sub nom. Appeal of Groff, 480 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1973).
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makes payment in full.24 Before making the final installment, the
debtor goes bankrupt.25
Does the secured party have possession for purposes of perfect-
ing a security interest? The court in In re Dolly Madison Industries,
Inc. did not think so. The court held that no pledge had been created
because "the pledgee must have absolute dominion and control over
the property." 6 Superficially, the court's conclusion makes sense.
"Absolute dominion and control" remained with the escrow agent
who was not an agent for either party2 7 But does the function of the
escrow arrangement differ so fundamentally from the bailee arrange-
ment-an accepted means of'taking constructive possession?
Is not the intent of the parties, in both cases, to insure that the
debtor does not obtain a benefit from the secured party without the
secured party having a contingent right to acquire the collateral?
Both the escrow agent and the bailee take the collateral from the
debtor's control until the obligations of the debtor to the secured
party are satisfied or until the debtor-creditor relationship is
terminated.
On facts quite similar to those in Dolly Madison, the court in In
re Copeland28 took a more enlightened approach and concluded that
if the escrow arrangement was interpreted as not giving the secured
party a perfected security interest in the stock, the entire intent of the
parties would be frustrated.29 In dealing with the issue of whether the
secured party took possession for purposes of section 9-305, the court
noted that "[o]nly when the limitations of common law pledge are
engrafted upon ... [section] 9-305 does this conceptual difficulty ap-
pear."30 In summary the court stated that if it held that an escrow
arrangement can never protect creditors against "'[third party
lienholders or the powers of a bankruptcy trustee ordebtor-in-posses-
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1042.
27. Id.
28. 391 F. Supp. 134 (D. Del. 1975), aff'd in part and vacated without prejudice in part,
531 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1976).
29. Id. at 150.
30. Id. at 151 (citation omitted). The court went on to comment:
[U]nder the Code, a chief purpose of requiring possession of certain collateral is
to provide notice to prospective third party creditors that the debtor no longer
has unfettered use of the collateral. Where, as here, physical possession of the
stock certificates was ... placed with WTC [escrow holder]..,. the effective notice
to other potential creditors was precisely the same as if Pension Benefit had taken
possession of the... stock... i.e., Copeland was without the certificates.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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sion],' "the court would "elevate 'technicality over substance and [ne-
gate] the reasonableness the Code hoped to impart to commercial
practices.' "31
Thus, apart from the philosophical question of what it means to
possess a thing, it is not always clear whether a secured party has pos-
session-for purposes of perfection-particularly when the collateral
is held by a bailee.
VII. PROBLEMS WrrH THE PLEDGE
What is it about the pledge that gives notice to third-party credi-
tors that the debtor no longer owns the collateral free and clear of
third-party claims? Is it that the debtor does not have possession of
the collateral or that the secured party does have possession?
On first glance it may seem not to matter. In either case, poten-
tial future creditors should be on notice because the debtor no longer
has physical possession of the collateral and therefore cannot use it to
secure other loans. Conversely, the fact that another party-the se-
cured creditor-has possession should also put other creditors on no-
tice that the debtor no longer owns the collateral free and clear.
But if the main purpose of the pledge is to prevent the debtor
from defrauding other creditors, why does the UCC emphasize pos-
session by the secured party, rather than relinquishment of possession
by the debtor? As long as the debtor no longer possesses the collat-
eral, it would seem that it cannot defraud other creditors.
Requiring that the secured party take possession of the collateral
puts the world on notice that the secured party has the security inter-
est in the collateral. Under this reasoning, requiring possession of the
collateral by the secured party for perfection of the security interest
makes sense. It still appears, however, that the most important conse-
quence for other creditors is the fact that the debtor no longer has
possession.
The concept of perfection has nothing to do with the legal rela-
tionship between the secured party and the debtor. The secured party
has rights with respect to the collateral whether or not the security
interest is perfected, assuming it has attached.32 Rather, perfection
relates to the secured party's rights vis-a-vis other creditors of the
31. Id. (quoting Comment, Attachment Under Section 9-204 and Perfection Under Sec-
tion 9-305 of the Uniform Commercial Code of Pennsylvania: Explicit Language Delaying
Attachment and Escrow As Satisfaction of Possession, 5 RUT.-CAM. LJ. 336, 344 (1974)).
32. For the requirements of attachment, see UCC § 9-203.
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debtor.33 Given this, the only role of perfection-whether by filing or
through possession-is to put the world on notice that a particular
secured party has taken a security interest in certain collateral of a
certain debtor.
Strangely, however, the text of the UCC does not state that the
primary rationale behind perfection is to give notice to other potential
creditors. 34 Professor Coogan explains that "[lIogically, of course, this
underlying rationale is obvious; otherwise, the sponsors might as well
have required secured parties to stand on their heads or look toward
Mecca or perform some other ritual in order to perfect their security
interests. 35
VIII. DOES PossEssoRY PERFECTION MAKE SENSE?
Is IT NEEDED?
The rationale behind perfection may be obvious, as Professor
Coogan notes. What is less obvious, however, is whether perfection
through possession serves that rationale. If the central purpose of
perfection is providing notice to third parties, it would seem more sen-
sible to require filing in all cases and not to allow possession as an
alternative means of perfecting a security interest.
If possessory perfection were not permitted, and filing was the
only means to perfect a security interest in goods, creditors would
have certainty as to whether or not the debtor's collateral was encum-
bered. There would be one place to search: the filing records of the
pertinent jurisdiction. The potential creditor would not be required to
make physical inspections in an effort to ascertain whether the debtor
actually has possession of the collateral.
By permitting perfection by possession, the UCC fails to simplify
and streamline the law of commercial secured transactions as much as
it otherwise could. The strongest argument against perfection by pos-
session is that it fails to fulfill its function: to provide notice to other
third parties that the secured party has taken a security interest in the
debtor's property.
33. See U.C.C. § 9-301 and accompanying official comments.
34. The text of Article 9 does not, unfortunately, specifically articulate the "public
notice" requirement. Professor Homer Kripke, in the early days of Article 9,
once casually mentioned the desirability of a phrase such as "giving (or excusing)
public notice," but neither he nor I followed this up at a time when it could easily
have been done .... In any event, the rationale is clear from the official
comments.
Coogan, supra note 5, at 1032 n.75.
35. Id.
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Years ago the pledge may have served that function well. The
pledge, by a debtor t6 a creditdr, of a wheelbarrow in the town mar-
ketplace may have 'put others on notice that the debtor no longer
owned the wheelbarrow free and clear. In our modem society the
pledge has outlived its usefulness.
In my opinion an important goal of the drafters of the UCC was
to create a commercial world of certainty, where issues to be litigated
are kept to a minimum, and factual inquiries minimized; a world
where objective, easily provable facts will determine a party's rights. 6
With possessory perfection, however, the UCC preserves for the
courts the proof issue of when a secured creditor gained possession
or-to use an irresistible double entendre-became possessed. This
may be difficult to prove and requires resort to shipping records, bills
of lading, and the like. These documents are often incomplete and, in
my opinion and experience, rarely describe all the goods which they
cover.
It is difficult to argue against the proposition that perfection by
filing is cheaper and better suited for notice purposes than perfection
by possession. It would be a matter of record who was first to perfect
and there would be no litigation concerning what is and what is not
possession. We must wean the UCC from the concept of perfection
by possession. By so doing, we lend more certainty and effectiveness
to the filing system, and decrease costs in all secured transactions.
I have raised this issue at the Article 9 drafting sessions, with the
response from the drafters that "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." I think
it is "broke." The pledge--insofai as it relates to goods-was appar-
ently included in the UCC due to its more than 5000 year history-
without much thought being given to its ramifications. I find this an
insufficient basis to continue it. Since we now have paper, phones,
computers, and UCC filing offices, it seems appropriate to retire this
tired, somewhat useless anachronism.
36. The avoidance of litigation is demonstrated by the elimination of the determination
of a party's priority based on "what it knew and when did it know it?" This issue is difficult
to prove. Indeed, I believe the only provision in the UCC where knowledge will affect
priority is § 9-401(2). This section deals with the rights of a secured party who filed "in
good faith in an improper place or not in all of the places required." This section provides
that the filing is nevertheless effective against "any person who has knowledge of the con-
tents of such financing statement." U.C.C. § 9-401(2) (1990).
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